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 1 Introduction 
 Paradigm shifts, conceptual revolutions, or even just multiple alternative 
models of ostensibly the same natural phenomenon, system, or entity 
pose a severe challenge to traditional scientific realism. A standard sci-
entific realist expects that our theories and models correspond to the 
relevant features of the natural world they are meant to represent, or that 
they at least aim to do so. As far as the standard realist is concerned, at 
most one such model will correspond to the way the world actually is; 
so how can more than one model enjoy predictive and other empirical 
successes? 
 In this chapter I look at two contemporary forms of scientific realism, 
each of which departs in crucial respects from the standard scientific real-
ist: structural realism and perspectival realism. 1 Both take seriously the 
challenge of a plurality of models and theories, but they wish to retain key 
elements of scientific realism, such as a commitment to a correspondence 
between scientific representations and the world, and to the idea that sci-
ence makes progress. Despite these shared commitments to realism, per-
spectival and structural realism offer substantially different responses to 
the challenges that arise from a plurality of models. After laying out the 
differences between the two views in section 2, I use models of measure-
ment as a type of scientific representation to illustrate the strengths and 
weaknesses of structural and perspectival realism. I conclude that, at least 
for meta-sciences like measurement theory, structural and perspectival 
realism might be complementary. 
 2 Realism: Structural and Perspectival 
 Both structural realists ( Worrall 1989 ;  Ladyman 1998 ;  French 2014 ) and 
perspectival realists ( Giere 2006 ;  Massimi 2012 ;  Teller 2017 ; Teller, this 
volume) want to address challenges arising from the plurality of scientific 
representations of ostensibly the same phenomenon or subject matter 
while maintaining a broadly realist outlook on science. 2 The plurality 
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of models is a challenge for the requirement of literalness of scientific 
representation endorsed by traditional scientific realists. The requirement 
of literalness is typically articulated from the syntactic view of theories 
and amounts to the claim that theoretical terms do not in general differ 
in their semantics from observational terms. The debate I focus on here, 
by contrast, is played out against the backdrop of the semantic view of 
theories, which takes  models as paradigmatic scientific representations. 
Whereas a traditional realist would be inclined to hold that a successful 
representation of a phenomenon means that there is a close correspon-
dence between elements of the model and elements of the phenomenon 
represented, both structural and perspectival realists recognize that mod-
els contain features that do not readily correspond to features in the phe-
nomenon represented. The fact that sometimes more than one model can 
be used to represent the same phenomenon provides particularly strong 
evidence for this lack of literal correspondence between model and phe-
nomenon. The question for both structural and perspectival realists is 
how to respond to the plurality of models while retaining a commitment 
to realism. Structural realists focus on the  commonalities among different 
representations and models, whereas perspectivalists emphasize the  dif-
ferences between models. 
 Structural realists suggest that we should focus on what is common 
to competing (successful) representations and that this commonality is 
structural. While each model will differ from the others in some way, 
all models of the phenomenon will have certain structural similarities. 
Our task is to identify these structural similarities, which is often done 
by finding transformations between models that leave particular features 
invariant. According to structural realism, what we learn about the world 
from these different models is confined to the structural similarities they 
share. Some structural realists want to take this epistemic view further 
and conclude that the world itself contains nothing but structure, but for 
present purposes I shall be concerned only with epistemic structural real-
ism, not ontic structural realism (for the distinction, see  Ladyman 1998 ). 
 For a plurality of models of ostensibly the same entity/system, this 
will mean that structuralists will only take features present in  all models 
as  representational , that is, only those features that are shared between 
the different models will count as relevant to the question of truth-qua-
correspondence, whereas features pertaining only to some models will be 
regarded as artifacts of the representation. Structuralists will further add 
that what is shared between the different models are  structural features, 
which are contrasted with haecceitistic or quidditistic differences among 
models. Structural features typically include relations among the elements 
of the model which remain invariant even as we “swap” or “replace” 
particular elements. For example, representations of particles that differ 
only with respect to  which particle in an ensemble of identically prepared 
particles has a given property will be regarded as only having haecceitistic 
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difference. Such haecceitistic differences, according to the structuralists, 
are not up for evaluation with respect to which of them “gets it right”; 
instead they are merely artifacts of representation. Models that differ 
from the original model only in assigning different “labels” to the parti-
cles are structurally similar to the first one, and there is nothing to choose 
between them. 3 Structural realism reduces the plurality of representations 
by treating many representations as equivalent. 
 The relational character of structure is contrasted, on the one hand, 
with haecceitistic and quidditistic differences and, on the other, with 
nature and ontology. In both cases, the idea seems to be that the same 
relational structure may underpin different conceptions of the nature of 
the phenomenon in question, or be instantiated in models with haec-
ceitistic or quidditistic differences. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, structuralists 
have focused much of their attention on the highly mathematized models 
used in the physical sciences. For such models, it is comparatively easy 
to give a characterization of the structure of the representation, and the 
abstraction involved in the mathematical representation makes it easier 
to see how the same relations can be used in otherwise different theories 
and models. The main challenge for structuralism is to develop a notion 
of structure that is both substantive enough to be controversial while also 
being a plausible candidate for what is in fact preserved across different 
theories/models. 
 Perspectivalists take a rather different approach to the plurality of mod-
els. Instead of focusing on the commonality among different models, per-
spectivalists regard each model as a complementary perspective on the 
same phenomenon. Unlike the structuralist, who limits what we should 
take as corresponding to the world in our models to what is (structurally) 
common to them, the perspectivalist takes differences between models as 
(potentially) informative about the world. Perspectivalists reject the idea 
that we ever approach the natural world independent of taking a particu-
lar perspective. Representation is inevitably perspectival; there is no view 
from nowhere ( Giere 2006 ;  van Fraassen 2008 ). 
 Moreover, not all perspectives are easily compatible. Notoriously, water 
is described as a viscous fluid by fluid dynamics and as a collection of 
particles by statistical mechanics. 4 These two descriptions seem to be in 
direct conflict, attributing contradictory properties to the same entity. 
Traditional realists would be inclined to insist that at least one of these 
models must be mistaken: it simply does not correspond to the nature of 
water. Structural realists might try to retreat to merely structural features 
of each model, but it is not obvious how that is going to resolve the dif-
ficulty in this case. Perspectivalists, by contrast, would like to retain both 
models as offering important insights into the nature of water. Neither 
is to be given up in favor of the other. Instead both models say some-
thing true about water, something that would be lost if we chose only one 
perspective as the uniquely true perspective. Whether there is nonetheless 
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room for realism from a perspectivalist standpoint will depend on how 
perspectivalists can characterize the relationship between the two or more 
apparently inconsistent models ( Giere 2009 ;  Massimi 2018b ). 
 Unlike structural and traditional realism, then, perspectivalism seems 
to be committed to a form of unavoidable pluralism. One question for 
perspectivalists is whether this pluralism is confined to our knowledge 
and representation of the world or whether it extends to the world, that 
is, whether the plurality of perspectives reveals that the world itself is 
somehow ontologically pluralistic. Especially the latter view seems to 
be difficult to reconcile with core commitments to realism. Realists are 
typically committed to a realist semantics for scientific representation, 
an optimistic epistemic outlook on scientific success and progress, and 
a picture of the world as uniquely structured in a certain way ( Psillos 
1999 ). This final point matters if we are to make sense of realism as being 
committed to the idea that our scientific theories correspond to what the 
world is like in its own right. If ontology is radically pluralistic, perhaps 
in the sense that entities only exist insofar as they are represented in a 
certain way, then this would seem to undermine a basic commitment 
of scientific realism. Perspectivalists in the philosophy of science do not 
typically wish to embrace this radical ontological departure from stan-
dard scientific realism ( Massimi 2012 ). 
 The main challenge for perspectival realism, then, is to make sense of 
the idea that each perspective captures something true about the phe-
nomenon in question while maintaining that these perspectives shed 
light on the same phenomenon or entity. This claim suggests a notion of 
perspectival truth that requires clarification and defense, since it seems 
difficult to reconcile the pluralism inherent in perspectivalism with the 
idea that claims about the world are either true or false. Some claims, 
it seems, would be true according to one perspective, yet false accord-
ing to another (see  Massimi 2018a for a qualified defense of perspec-
tival truth). Moreover, something needs to be said about why it is that 
the different perspectives contribute something epistemically valuable 
to inquiry, while nonetheless remaining distinct and possibly irreconcil-
able. Even if the pluralism is confined to our knowledge or representation 
of the world, most realists would also be uncomfortable with the idea 
that our knowledge is always confined to perspectival knowledge only 
( Chakravartty 2010 ). 
 Perspectival and structural realism, then, differ in their approach to 
scientific representation. To assess the strength and weaknesses of each as 
realist approaches to scientific representation, I will now turn to measure-
ment theory. Measurement theory addresses the question how numerical 
representations of empirical attributes and phenomena of interest are 
possible. Any form of realism about such representations will want to 
insist that there are some constraints on which representations qualify as 
adequate representations of the relevant attributes. 
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 Measurement theory is of particular interest for the comparison of 
perspectival and structural realism for two reasons. First, measurement 
theory is not a first-order science in the manner of physics or biology; 
its subject matter is not a specific class of phenomena or aspect of the 
natural world. Measurement theory, at least as it is understood today, is 
a meta-science that studies the mathematical formalism used to represent 
measurements. What we can learn from it may hence be quite different 
from the conclusions we draw from case studies of models in particular 
sciences. Second, since measurement theory explicitly deals with a certain 
type of scientific representation, it seems especially appropriate to ask 
what structural and perspectival realists might have to say about it. In the 
next section I will present some problems for a literalist reading of mea-
surement representations, which I interpret as being akin to traditional 
scientific realism. In sections 4 and 5 we will see how structural and per-
spectival realism can be combined to provide a better understanding of 
measurement representations. 
 3  Representationalism and Literalism in 
Measurement Theory 
 Measurement theory was not always a meta-science. Especially in the first 
half of the 20th century, the study of measurement and quantities was 
considered part of physical theorizing. Many important contributions to 
measurement theory were made by physicists, often as part of working 
out the foundations of physics ( Tolman 1917 ;  Campbell 1920 ;  Bridgman 
1927 ). The idea behind these approaches was that measurement theory 
was supposed to give an accurate account of physical quantities. Physical 
quantities were thought to be unique in permitting numerical representa-
tion, and the question was which features of these attributes made them 
numerically representable. 
 Early axiomatizations of measurement focused on the idea that quan-
titative attributes were numerically representable  because they were addi-
tive ( Helmholtz 1887 /2010;  Hölder 1901 ). We can both order objects of 
a domain by length (from shortest to longest) and concatenate objects 
in the domain in such a way that the combined object has the “sum” of 
the lengths of the two concatenated objects. Lengths, masses, and other 
paradigmatic physical magnitudes can be “added” in (almost) the way 
numbers are added. The natural conclusion for many thinkers was that 
quantities can be given numerical representations in virtue of being addi-
tive. Additivity was thereby made into a necessary condition for being 
a quantitative attribute. These early axiomatizations for quantities con-
tained two types of axioms: axioms governing the ordering of objects and 
axioms governing additivity. These axioms were thought to constrain how 
numbers could be assigned to objects, or perhaps they were understood 
as something like conditions for the possibility of numerical assignment. 
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 This approach to the question of how numerical representations of 
attributes are possible is characterized by a form of “literalism”: it is 
possible to represent attributes numerically if and only if there is a direct 
correspondence between features of the attribute and features of the 
numbers. Moreover, one such feature, additivity, was selected as a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for all numerical representation. For physi-
cal attributes, additivity had to be demonstrated empirically, by finding 
suitable concatenation operations for objects instantiating the attribute 
in question. The apparent direct correspondence between the operation 
of placing rods end to end, or placing weights in the same pan of a beam 
balance, and arithmetical addition operations on numbers was under-
stood to be the key to the numerical representation of attributes like 
length and mass. 
 While additivity seems to fit nicely as a criterion for some paradig-
matic physical quantities like mass and length, it does not fit neatly for 
all physical quantities. There are two types of problems. First, not all 
physical attributes seem to be additive in the sense that combining objects 
with different magnitudes of these attributes results in an increased mag-
nitude of the attribute that could be interpreted as the sum of the two 
contributing magnitudes. Density and temperature are typical examples 
of this. Mass density is understood as mass per volume. Both mass and 
volume are additive quantities and hence fall squarely into the physical 
measurement paradigm. But while the masses and volumes of appropri-
ately concatenated objects will increase in such a way as to form the sums 
of the respective masses and volumes, the same is not true for density. 
Fluids of different densities will typically form uniform density layers 
(e.g., when trying to mix honey and milk) instead of combining or pro-
duce a mixture of intermediate density somewhere between the two start-
ing densities. Similarly, if we mix two fluids of different temperature, say 
coffee and milk, the resulting fluid does not have a temperature that is the 
“sum” of the two contributing temperatures but instead an intermediate 
temperature. 5 
 The second type of problem is due to the operationalism built into 
many versions of the additivity paradigm as a result of its commitment 
to literalism. Additivity of an attribute is linked to the availability of a 
concatenation operation for objects instantiating the attribute, which 
means this approach rules out attributes for which no concatenation 
operation is available and attributes for which no  unique concatena-
tion operation is available. 
 Concatenation operations do not seem to be available for temporal 
intervals (except perhaps for the special case of adjacent intervals), yet we 
do think that time is numerically representable and indeed in some sense 
additive. The problem here is simply that we cannot manipulate events and 
intervals as easily as we can manipulate certain kinds of physical objects. 
Even in the case of physical objects, our ability to concatenate them is 
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limited: we assume that the masses of planets behave in a manner compa-
rable to that of pebbles, even though we cannot concatenate the former in 
the same way we concatenate the latter. 
 On the other hand, some quantities seem to have more than one “natu-
ral” concatenation operation. Compare, for example, electrical resistance 
in series and parallel circuits. Resistors connected in series yield additive 
resistance in a straightforward way: the total resistance in the circuit is 
just the sum of the resistance of each resistor. Resistors connected in par-
allel do not yield additive resistance, but yield the reciprocal of resistance: 
the total reciprocal resistance is the sum of the reciprocal resistance of 
each resistor. Neither parallel nor series circuits are more natural than the 
other, yet in both cases we seem to end up with an additive quantity: resis-
tance and its reciprocal. The two quantities seem so closely connected that 
even distinguishing them seems somewhat misleading. Instead it looks like 
there are just two different ways of concatenating resistors, and either 
way of doing it yields a total resistance measure that is additive. There is 
no unique way of combining resistors in a circuit that yields an additive 
representation; instead there are two. 
 A similar sort of problem can be generated for the case of length. While 
we ordinarily assume that the natural way to concatenate lengths is to 
place rods end to end in a straight line, Brian  Ellis (1966 ) showed that 
placing rods at right angles to each other also yields an additive represen-
tation of length, just not the one we find familiar. While Ellis’s example 
might seem contrived, it is very difficult to say why we should prefer 
our standard concatenation of length to his unconventional one, other 
than sheer familiarity. The concern for the additivity paradigm is that the 
straightforward link between a natural concatenation operation and a 
numerical representation of the attribute featuring the addition operation 
breaks down. 
 The additivity paradigm is motivated by a form of  literalism about numeri-
cal representations of quantities: quantitative attributes are numerically rep-
resentable because, under concatenation, objects with that attribute behave 
like numbers with respect to addition. Numbers correspond to objects, and 
addition between numbers corresponds to concatenation between objects. 
If there is either no plausible way of concatenating the relevant objects (e.g., 
temporal intervals or planets) or if there is more than one plausible way 
of doing so (e.g., rods or resistors), then this literal interpretation becomes 
doubtful. There is no longer a unique, natural correspondence between the 
manipulation of objects (and thereby indirectly the magnitudes of quanti-
ties) and the numbers. 
 The literalism of the additivity paradigm is, hence, rather restric-
tive. While there are some physical quantities that satisfy the strict 
requirements of additivity (at least in a limited domain), even among phys-
ical quantities there are problem cases. For sciences other than physics, 
the problem is far more severe: in sciences like psychology, no attributes 
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of interest seem to have additive structure or be amenable to concat-
enation. Unsurprisingly, psychologists like S. S.  Stevens (1946 ) rejected 
the additivity paradigm and proposed instead that measurement sim-
ply meant the numerical representation of attributes according to some 
rule or other. This notion of measurement strikes many as too weak and 
too easily achieved (see  Michell 1999 for a detailed critique of this and 
related notions of measurement in psychology). The question is, there-
fore, whether it is possible to free measurement representations from the 
shackles of literalism without giving up on the idea that numerical rep-
resentations of attributes reflect something about the nature of the attri-
butes thus represented. 
 The radical literalism of the additivity paradigm is akin to the view 
standard scientific realists take with respect to scientific representation 
in general. The standard realist expects that features of the representa-
tion correspond (literally!) to features of the phenomenon or entity rep-
resented and, conversely, they require of a representation that it captures 
the features of the represented entity. A close correspondence between 
features of the representation and features of the represented entity is 
what makes for successful scientific representation. This is the reasoning 
behind the additivity paradigm as well. Numerical representations are 
additive and, hence, we want to be entitled to infer that attributes repre-
sented numerically are also additive. Conversely, if a representation were 
to lack key features of an attribute, such as its additivity, the representa-
tion would be inadequate. For standard realists, this kind of literalism is 
part of what it means to be a realist. 
 In the following section, I will look at the representational theory of 
measurement (RTM), which arose in response to the problems with the 
additivity paradigm. I shall first show that RTM looks like a form of 
structural realism about representation. In section 5, we will see that this 
structural realism needs to be combined with perspectivalism. 
 4  Structural Realism in the Representational 
Theory of Measurement 
 Today measurement theory is a mathematical framework that describes 
the conditions under which numerical (and, more generally, mathemati-
cal) representations of attributes are possible. The most developed 
framework of this kind is the representational theory of measurement, 
which describes measurement as a representation of empirical relational 
structures by numerical relational structures ( Krantz, Suppes, Luce, and 
Tversky 1971 , 9). Even contemporary alternatives to representationalism, 
for example ( Domotor and Batitsky 2008 ), share this highly mathemati-
cal character and do not proceed from within a particular science. A great 
advantage of RTM is that it describes a range of different types of struc-
tures axiomatically and shows what type of numerical representations 
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are possible for these structures. The representationalist theory thereby 
incorporates a key feature of Stevens’s permissive approach to measure-
ment, namely the idea that  different features of numerical structures can 
be used to establish a mapping between an empirical structure and a 
numerical structure. There is no need for such mappings to be confined to 
additive structures. Additive structures become merely a type of empirical 
structure that can be numerically represented. 
 To provide such an axiomatic framework, RTM first provides axi-
oms for various types of structures. 6 A structure is here simply a set 
with relations and operations defined on it. The exact nature of the 
relations and operations is specified by the axioms. Crucially for RTM, 
both numerical structures (e.g., the real numbers, ordering, and addi-
tion) and empirical structures (e.g., a set of weights when ordered and 
concatenated using a beam balance) might satisfy these axioms. By char-
acterizing structures in this abstract, axiomatic fashion, RTM lays the 
foundation for showing how a mapping from the empirical structure 7 to 
the numerical structure is possible. Such a mapping will typically be a 
 homomorphism , that is, a structure-preserving map. As we represent an 
empirical structure using a numerical structure, the numerical structure 
will reflect  structural features of the empirical structure. According to 
RTM, this preservation of structure is the key to understanding mea-
surement representations. Much of RTM then proceeds to show, in a 
mathematically rigorous way, what kinds of representations are possible 
for different types of empirical structures. 
 To do so, first a representation theorem and then a uniqueness theorem 
are proved. The former demonstrates that if an empirical structure satisfies 
the axioms for a particular structure, for example an additive extensive 
structure, then there is a structure-preserving mapping from the empirical 
relational structure to a suitable numerical structure (suitable insofar as 
the numerical structure will also satisfy the axioms for additive extensive 
structures), such that certain conditions are satisfied. For additive exten-
sive structures the following two conditions are satisfied: (i) the mapping 
is such that the ordering of objects in the empirical domain is reflected in 
the order of the numbers assigned to the objects: a ≺ b iff  f (a) <  f (b); and 
(ii) the mapping is such that the concatenated object a ∘ b 8 is mapped to 
the sum of the numerical values for a and b:  f (a ∘ b) =  f (a) +  f (b). 
 The uniqueness theorem then shows how unique this mapping from 
the empirical structure to the numerical structure is by demonstrating 
how other mappings satisfying the same two conditions are related to 
our original mapping  f . It turns out that for additive extensive structures, 
any mapping  f ′ such that  f ′ = α f for some real value α > 0 will satisfy the 
two conditions given above. So once it has been established that one such 
homomorphic mapping from the empirical structure to the numerical 
structure is possible, many more such mappings are also possible, dif-
fering from the first one only by multiplication by a positive factor α. In 
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measurement practice this is often taken to mean that we can change the 
unit of measurement, for example, from centimeters to inches, without 
losing any important information. The representational theory of mea-
surement thereby shows which numerical representations are equivalent 
in the sense of being mere notational variants of each other. 
 While the preceding example illustrates the features of mappings for 
additive extensive structures, the same general method is applicable to 
other structures as well. Indeed, this is what most of the rest of  Founda-
tions of Measurement concerns itself with: various types of structures 
are axiomatically characterized and then shown to be representable by 
numerical structures to varying degrees of uniqueness. Whereas earlier 
axiomatizations of measurement had focused on capturing what was 
necessary for establishing the additive character of an attribute, RTM 
instead begins from the idea that measurement involves an axiomatic 
characterization of a measurement structure but does not put any con-
straints on the features such a structure might have. Once a measurement 
structure has been axiomatically characterized, we can then ask what 
kind of numerical representation of such a structure might be possible 
(the representation theorem) and how unique such a representation will 
turn out to be (the uniqueness theorem). Mass is numerically represent-
able because massive objects stand in empirical relations of ordering 
and concatenation, that is, it satisfies the axioms for additive extensive 
structures. Temperature, on the other hand, is numerically representable 
because relations of congruence and betweenness hold between differ-
ences in temperature; temperature satisfies the axioms for absolute dif-
ference structures. 9 The features that make possible a representation of 
an attribute by numbers are structural features, as is clear from the fact 
that the mapping between them is a homomorphic mapping: a mapping 
that preserves structure. 
 The axiomatic characterizations of RTM are distinctively structural: 
the axioms characterize structures, that is, sets with relations and opera-
tions defined on them. This structural characterization turns out to be 
more abstract than the literalist construal of attributes as additive. An 
additive extensive structure, for example, is characterized by axioms 
describing a set with an ordering relation and a binary operation that sat-
isfy certain conditions. The binary operation does not have to be addition, 
even though numerical addition satisfies the axioms. But other binary 
operations, like multiplication, work just as well. A consequence of this 
axiomatic approach is that even though the numerical structure used to 
represent a particular attribute may be additive in the sense of involving 
the addition operation, the attribute thus represented might lack a con-
catenation operation or might lack a unique concatenation operation. 
RTM can thereby explain some of the anomalies encountered under the 
additivity paradigm. Length and electrical resistance have additive exten-
sive structures because they satisfy the abstract axioms specifying such 
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structures. It turns out that they can do so in different ways depending on 
the empirical set-up chosen, but since the mapping is not thought to hold 
between a particular concatenation operation and numerical addition, 
instead holding in virtue of the satisfaction of the axioms, these cases are 
no longer anomalies under the new paradigm. 
 Moreover, since RTM describes a wide range of different structures, 
only some of which are characterized by axioms involving binary oper-
ations, RTM can allow for the numerical representation of attributes 
like temperature and other “intensive” quantities. RTM thereby avoids 
the constraints placed on numerical representation by the additivity 
paradigm. 
 The resolution of the anomalies and the inclusion of non-additive attri-
butes is made possible by the move to a structural characterization of the 
target of measurement representations. Instead of literalism, which com-
mitted the additivity paradigm to the claim that measurable attributes 
must be additive like numbers, representationalism allows for a variety 
of ways in which attributes can have structures that satisfy specific axi-
oms. Since the representation theorem shows that structures satisfying 
the axioms are representable by certain numerical structures (because 
it is possible to construct a structure-preserving map from the empiri-
cal to the numerical structure), the structural characterization is key to 
the representational theory. RTM assumes that what makes numerical 
representations possible is a structural similarity between numbers (and 
the relations and operations defined on them) and attributes, like mass 
or temperature (and the empirical relations and operations available for 
collections of objects instantiating them). Moreover, to decide when two 
numerical representations should count as notational variants of each 
other, RTM asks whether the two representations preserve the same 
structure. This is done through the uniqueness theorem, which compares 
homomorphic mappings to one another. 10 Structure that is invariant 
across different mappings is considered an objective feature of the attri-
bute in question. 
 RTM can therefore be described as a form of structural realism about 
representation: structural commonalities among representations of the 
same attribute are indicative of objective or genuine features of the attri-
bute, whereas features that vary in different representations (such as a 
change in unit) are to be regarded as conventional artifacts. Like struc-
tural realism, RTM assumes that there is a clear distinction between ele-
ments of the representation that correspond to features of the represented 
attribute and elements of the representation that are due to convention 
only; moreover, the features that correspond to features of the attribute 
are  structural features only. Structural features are here once again  rela-
tions , in contrast to haecceitistic features. Structural correspondence, as 
demonstrated through structure-preserving mappings, makes for success-
ful representation for RTM. 
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 5 Keeping Things in Perspective 
 RTM seems to be committed to a form of structural realism about 
numerical representation, and insofar as RTM is the most developed 
framework for measurement representations, this would suggest that 
structural realism provides an adequate account of numerical representa-
tion. Before drawing that conclusion, however, we must ask how widely 
accepted the representationalist paradigm for measurement theory is. 
Few would argue with the claim that the representationalist theory of 
measurement, especially as presented in  Foundations of Measurement , 
constitutes the most thorough formal treatment of “measurement struc-
tures” and their numerical representation. Nonetheless, representational-
ism is not without critics, with a main line of criticism being whether 
representationalism truly amounts to a theory of  measurement ( Savage 
and Ehrlich 1992 ). This criticism seems even more pertinent given that 
RTM has not had as much of an impact on research practice in fields like 
psychology as might have been expected ( Cliff 1992 ). While there are 
several aspects of measurement practice that seem to receive relatively 
little attention on the representationalist view, for the purposes of per-
spectivalism the most interesting criticism concerns the question of how 
we decide whether a given attribute satisfies the axioms for a particular 
measurement structure. 
 The application of the representationalist framework in any given sci-
entific context requires three steps: one conceptual, the other two math-
ematical ( Luce et al. 1990 , 201). The first step (i) is to determine  whether 
an attribute of interest satisfies the axioms for a given measurement 
structure. Once this has been established, the representationalist frame-
work can then be used to show (ii)  that a numerical representation of the 
attribute is possible and (iii)  how unique that representation is. Steps (ii) 
and (iii) are important for establishing which scale type is appropriate for 
the attribute and which inferences can be drawn from the representation. 
The representationalist theory of measurement provides detailed proofs 
of representation and uniqueness theorems for wide range of axiomati-
cally characterized measurement structures, which ensures that steps (ii) 
and (iii) are clearly justified in setting up a numerical representation. 
However, RTM has very little to say about the very first step. 
 To establish that an attribute of interest can be numerically represented, 
we need to know whether we have reason to believe that the attribute 
satisfies the axioms for some measurement structure. If such reasons can 
be found, then RTM simply provides steps (ii) and (iii). Whether such 
reasons can be found, however, will depend both on empirical observa-
tions and theoretical assumptions. Some of the theoretical assumptions 
are “inductive.” Suppose we have found a means to concatenate objects 
systematically for a finite range of magnitudes for a given quantity and 
that these concatenations do indeed yield “sums.” We might then wish 
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to extend the assumption that magnitudes of this quantity are additive 
beyond the range for which we are able to carry out empirical concat-
enations. This is the type of assumption that leads us to conclude that 
mass satisfies the axioms for additive extensive structures, even though 
we have only concatenated a limited number of massive objects and even 
though some types of massive objects, like planets, eschew concatenation 
altogether. Another type of theoretical assumption concerns the depen-
dence of quantities on other quantities, a situation commonly exploited 
in “indirect” or “non-fundamental” measurement. In these cases, the 
structure of one of the attributes is inferred from its nomic relationship 
to other attributes whose structure is presumed to be known. This situ-
ation is common for many measurements in physics, for example, for 
the measurement of temperature using the relationship between pressure, 
temperature, and volume. But how can we establish that such a nomic 
relationship indeed holds, without being able to measure each quantity 
independently? 11 
 Much of the dispute in sciences like psychology and in other fields 
concerns precisely the question whether we are justified in assuming that 
a particular attribute indeed satisfies the axioms for a particular measure-
ment structure. Reasons to support such a claim are never free from theo-
retical assumptions of the sort mentioned and can hence be contested. 
This theory dependence opens the door for a more perspectivalist reading 
of measurement representations. 
 The perspectivalist reading begins from the observation that an axi-
omatic structure by itself does not represent anything in particular. To 
be a representation of a particular attribute or empirical structure, the 
axiomatic structure needs to be interpreted. This interpretation connects 
aspects of the phenomenon of interest to the axioms characterizing that 
abstract structure. For measurement structures the interpretation will 
involve characterizing the phenomenon or attribute of interest as hav-
ing a certain structure ( van Fraassen 2008 ). Interpretations like these, 
as we have just seen, can be contested because they make theoretical 
assumptions. 
 Philosophers sometimes seem to think of interpretation as the task of 
finding a suitable empirical interpretation for an otherwise unspecified 
axiomatic structure. But while this highlights the way in which axioms 
leave their interpretations unspecified, this is not the way most scientists 
encounter the problem. Quite the reverse. Scientists typically start from an 
attribute or phenomenon they wish to represent numerically. The question 
is,  which structural representation is appropriate? Ostensibly the same 
attribute (e.g., utility or temperature) or phenomenon (e.g., light or water) 
is given different structural characterizations in the context of different 
theories. For example, Bradford Skow has argued that thermodynam-
ics only provides very weak reasons for thinking that temperature has a 
metric structure (either an absolute difference or a ratio scale structure), 
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whereas statistical mechanics provides strong reasons for thinking that 
temperature has metric structure ( Skow 2011 ). Which (measurement) 
structure we are justified in ascribing to temperature, then, depends on 
our theory of temperature. 
 This type of theory dependence looks like the theory dependence of 
other types of scientific representation. Recall the models of water as a 
fluid and as a collection of particles we briefly discussed at the beginning. 
Traditional realists will suggest that at most one of these models correctly 
represents water, whereas perspectivalists suggest that each offers an 
informative perspective on water. Similarly, for the case of temperature, 
a traditional realist will be inclined to suggest that statistical mechanics 
provides the correct account of what temperature is and, hence, the cor-
rect assignment of structure to temperature. By contrast, a perspectivalist 
will insist that we take seriously both the thermodynamic and statistical 
mechanical perspectives on temperature. Either way, the structural real-
ism embedded in RTM does not tell us whether to go with traditional 
realism or perspectivalism on this point, since RTM does not deal with 
the question of how to decide which structure to ascribe to particular 
attributes. 
 Perspectival realists differ in their responses to the problem of incon-
sistent models (compare, for example, the difference between  Giere 2006 
and  Massimi 2018b ). In the case of different measurement structures 
ascribed to temperature, it is tempting to conclude that, since statisti-
cal mechanics is a more fundamental theory than thermodynamics, we 
should simply go with the structure ascribed to temperature by statistical 
mechanics. This reading seems even more compelling when we remember 
that in this case the two structures ascribed to temperature are not strictly 
speaking incompatible. After all, the metric structure ascribed to tem-
perature by statistical mechanics is simply stronger than the mere ordinal 
structure implied by thermodynamics: an attribute that possesses metric 
structure also possesses ordinal structure. Semantically, then, we should 
accept the structural realists’ claim that the structure of the numerical 
representation corresponds to the structure of the attribute. Which rep-
resentation is adequate is then a question of what structure the attribute 
actually has. Structural realism here looks very much like traditional 
realism in its commitment to a correspondence between features of the 
representation and features of the represented attribute. The only differ-
ence between structural realism and traditional realism is that structural 
realism restricts this correspondence to structure only. 
 Perspectival realism has a different contribution to make, however. 
As  Massimi (2012 ) has argued, perspectivalism contributes to the realist 
quest by supplying the relevant notion of justification. To be realists, not 
only do we need to have a realist semantics of the relevant representa-
tions, but we also need a realist epistemology that distinguishes justified 
from unjustified beliefs about the phenomena and entities in question. 
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The justification (as opposed to the aptness) of a belief, according to 
Massimi, is a matter of coherence with a given scientific perspective. 
 This notion of perspectival justification is relevant for the case of the 
attribution of measurement structures. The literalist additivity paradigm 
proceeded from the assumption that the availability of an empirical con-
catenation operation was both necessary and sufficient for an attribute to 
qualify as a quantity. No other justification could be given for represent-
ing an attribute numerically. The additivity paradigm thereby provided a 
universal criterion for quantitativeness, with no room for different theo-
retical approaches. On the representational theory, this requirement has 
been given up, but at the cost of leaving open how we should justify 
ascribing a specific structure to an attribute. Perspectival realism (of the 
epistemic variety) fills in the gap. Measurement structure is ascribed to 
an attribute from within a scientific perspective, such as thermodynam-
ics or statistical mechanics. The ascription of a particular measurement 
structure to a given attribute has to cohere with the relevant theoretical 
background commitments and beliefs. While many scientists speculated 
that temperature might have a metric structure even before the advent of 
statistical mechanics (see  Skow 2011 for discussion), it is only from the 
perspective of statistical mechanics that such an ascription is justified. 
 Since RTM is silent on the question of how to justify the attribution 
of measurement structures to attributes, the structural realism at work 
in RTM is insufficient to satisfy the realist quest for measurement rep-
resentations. Structural realism only provides the realist semantics for 
measurement representations, since it specifies which features of the 
numerical representation correspond to features of the attribute. Per-
spectival realism is needed to complement this picture, since perspectival 
realism provides a notion of epistemic justification for attributions of 
measurement structures that makes sense of the different attributions of 
measurement structures by different theories. 
 6 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I looked at structural realism and perspectival realism 
initially as two competing responses to the plurality of scientific rep-
resentations. My focus has been on representations of measurement. I 
argued that literalism about measurement representations, which corre-
sponds to a traditional form of realism about representation, is inad-
equate. The representational theory of measurement, which provides a 
thoroughgoing account of numerical representations, implies structural 
realism about measurement representations. While RTM avoids some of 
the difficulties with the literalist reading, it needs to be supplemented 
with epistemic perspectival realism to account for the theory dependence 
of our justifications for ascribing particular measurement structures to 
attributes of interest. 
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 There is a broader, more speculative lesson we might learn from this 
case. At least in some cases, structural realism and perspectival realism are 
not competing realist accounts of representation but instead offer comple-
mentary pieces in the realist quest. Structural realists do well in supplying 
a more appropriate notion of correspondence between representation and 
represented phenomenon by freeing representation from literalism. Per-
spectival realists, on the other hand, provide an account of the justifica-
tion of using different representations of ostensibly the same phenomenon 
or attribute. This is important since, even after all equivalent (numerical) 
representations have been explained by structural realism, different scien-
tific theories still ascribe different structures to the same attribute. 
 Notes 
  1 . There are non-realist versions of both structuralism and perspectivalism, 
which I do not have room to discuss explicitly in this chapter. These views 
share the respective structural and perspectival outlook on scientific repre-
sentation (discussed in the next section) but without any commitment to a 
form of scientific realism. 
 2 . As with any view in philosophy, there are in-house disputes among structural 
realists and perspectival realists. Since my main purpose here is to contrast 
the two different approaches, I shall set aside the finer points of disagreement 
in each camp. 
 3 . The question of whether haecceitistic differences matter in the context of quan-
tum particles is discussed in, for example,  French (1989 ) and  Huggett (1999 ). 
 4 . For discussions of this example, see  Morrison (1999 ) and  Teller (2001 ). 
  5 . Quantities that behave like density and temperature have sometimes been 
called “intensive quantities,” in contrast to extensive quantities like mass and 
volume. The distinction between intensive and extensive quantities is not 
always clearly defined, nor is it uncontested.  Tolman (1917 , 239) defined 
intensive quantities to be non-additive;  Suppes (1951 ), by contrast, replaces 
the additivity demand with the idea that extensive quantities are quantities 
that can be represented on ratio scales, whereas intensive quantities are only 
representable on weaker scales. 
 6 . For example, RTM describes a structure as a (closed) additive extensive 
structure, by providing a set of characteristic axioms ( Krantz et al. 1971 , 73): 
 Let A  be a nonempty set, ≿  a binary relation on A , and ∘  a closed binary 
operation on A.  The triple ⟨A, ≿, ∘⟩  is a closed extensive structure  iff the 
following four axioms are satisfied for all a, b, c, d, ∈ A: 
 1. Weak order: ⟨A, ≿⟩  is a weak order, i.e., ≿  is a transitive and con-
nected relation . 
 2. Weak associativity: a ∘ (b ∘ c) ∼ (a ∘ b) ∘ c. 
 3. Monotonicity: a ≿ b iff a ∘ c ≿ b ∘ c iff c ∘ a ≿ c ∘ b 
 4. Archimedean: If a ≻ b , then for any c, d ∈ A , there exists a positive 
integer n  such that na ∘ c ≿ nb ∘ d , where na  is defined inductively as: 
1a = a, (n + 1)a = na ∘ a. 
 7 . Traditionally these structures are understood as domains of concrete objects 
and “empirical,” that is, observable qualitative relations among them. This 
interpretation reflects the empiricist and operationalist commitments of the 
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founders of RTM, but it is not the only available interpretation. Instead the 
structures can be understood, for example, as sets of space-time points with 
relations among them ( Field 1980 ). 
  8 . As before, the concatenated object might be understood as two physical 
objects combined operationally (e.g., by placing two rods end to end). Cru-
cially, it is a mapping between an empirical or physical domain and a numeri-
cal (or mathematical) domain. 
  9 . I will return to the question of how we are justified in ascribing a particular 
structure to an attribute in section 5. 
 10 . The technical details of this comparison are a bit too elaborate to be included 
in the discussion here. For relevant literature, see  Luce, Krantz, Suppes, and 
Tversky (1990 ), especially chap. 20. 
 11 . For a detailed discussion of this problem in the case of temperature, see  Chang 
(2004 ). 
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